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Introduction 
 
The Asian economic crisis which began with the floating of the bhat by Thailand on 
July 1 1997 is still having devastating effects on the livelihood and the well being of 
millions of people in many parts of the world.  The financial crisis spread from 
Thailand to other Asian countries, subsequently to Russia and more recently to Brazil. 
Fortunately, timely and decisive action by the US Federal Reserve last autumn 
(instituting three successive reductions in interest rates) has enabled advanced 
countries to escape the crisis so far. Nevertheless it is estimated by the World Bank 
that as a consequence of the crisis the rate of growth of world GDP is 2 percentage 
points lower both in 1998 and in 1999 than it would otherwise have been.  A rough 
calculation shows that this amounts to a huge loss over these two years of $120 per 
capita in production or income for each man, woman and child in the world.  This also 
suggests indirectly that hundreds of millions of people in poor countries who live on a 
dollar a day or less are likely to have become considerably poorer still as a result of 
the crisis.  
 
The burden of this lost output, employment and incomes is of course not evenly 
distributed.  Rather it has fallen disproportionately on the poor and especially on the 
women in the countries most affected by the crisis.  Hence there has been  a massive 
increase in poverty, unemployment and under-employment as well as huge reductions 
in real wages in countries like Indonesia and Thailand as we shall see in the following 
sections. 
 
However despite the current serious problems in the world economy and its negative 
implications for poverty and jobs, if we look at these phenomena in a longer term 
perspective the picture is rather different.  During the last half century humanity has 
achieved historically unprecedented increases in nutrition, health, education, life 
expectation and reduction in material poverty. Experiences differ between countries 
and have varied over time but on average it is arguable that people in the developing 
world have recorded more material economic progress between 1950 - 1980 than they 
did in the last three thousand years.
1
 
 
Although economic growth has slowed down after 1980 in Latin America and Africa, 
it continued apace in Asia until the present crisis. However it is important to 
remember that despite the increase in poverty caused by the debt crisis and the so-
called ‘lost decade’ of the 1980s in Latin America, there has been significant progress 
in democracy and empowerment of the people on that continent. 
                                                 
1
   This point is discussed in detail in Patel (1995); see also section II below. 
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The last fifty years have yielded many important lessons about poverty, its 
consequences, its relationship to other variables such as employment and economic 
growth. There have also been outstanding success stories in poverty reduction as well 
as abject failures. But the important point of this historical experience, and the 
associated analytical efforts to explore poverty in its various dimensions, is that 
poverty can be greatly diminished and indeed eliminated altogether throughout the 
world in a relatively short time. Humanity in principle has the resources and the 
capacity to do so.  This paper will discuss the conditions necessary and the policies 
required to achieve this vast and worthy objective. 
 
In his recent proposal for a comprehensive framework for development the President 
of the World bank, James Wolfensohn, has observed: “ While macroeconomic 
management is never perfect - there will always be some fluctuations in output and 
employment - the most effective safety net is a policy which maintains full 
employment. Deep recessions and depressions have adverse effects on virtually every 
one of the elements of the development strategy: health deteriorates, schooling is 
interrupted, and poverty increases. Formal safety nets are but an imperfect stop-gap 
measure in addressing the failures of effective macro policies to maintain the economy 
at full employment”. 
 
Wolfensohn  is right to stress the role of employment as the most effective way of 
dealing with poverty. Indeed in the way that our societies are presently organised most 
people would accept that unemployment is not only an economic waste, but also leads 
to social degradation with serious consequences for the individual and society. It 
lowers self-esteem, is demotivating, creates insecurity, resistance to technical change, 
among other things. Unemployment is deeply damaging to the status of the citizen. 
The question of unemployment is crucial because of its all-pervading, comprehensive 
economic and social linkages. Moreover, history tells us that if unemployment reaches 
a high level, it often gives rise to economic and political strife. 
 
Although unemployment has been greatly exacerbated in many developing countries 
by the present crisis, it is an extremely important continuing long-term problem for 
almost all developing countries. It is also a central policy concern in many advanced 
countries. 
 
In view of the above considerations, this paper concentrates on the question of 
employment. It focuses on the key issues of the inter-relationship between growth, 
employment and poverty, and pays particular attention to the gender dimensions of 
employment and poverty. These topics are considered here in the context of the 
globalisation and the liberalisation of the world economy. The emphasis of the paper 
is on policy: what should be done to eradicate poverty, to provide remunerative jobs to 
all those who want them. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows.  The next section considers in historical 
perspective the achievements of the developing world with respect to reducing poverty 
and outlines the nature and dimensions of the task that remains to be accomplished.  
Section III reviews evidence on the salient characteristics of labour markets in both 
developed and developing countries, paying particular attention to issues of 
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unemployment, underemployment and real wages.  Section IV outlines the 
consequences of the Asian crisis for poverty, unemployment and real wages.  Section 
V identifies the short- and long-term policy issues and examines, both analytically and 
empirically, the interrelationship between poverty, employment and economic growth.  
Section VI considers other relevant issues, specifically the relationship between 
technological change and unemployment; it also considers factors other than 
economic growth that may have a major affect on poverty, such as income instability, 
inflation and fiscal policy.  Sections VII and VIII outline policy measures for creating 
adequately remunerative work opportunities to aid in the elimination of global poverty 
and its attendant instability, insecurity and extreme deprivation. 
 
Finally it may be useful to note that although this paper considers conditions in both 
developed and developing countries, it pays greater attention to the latter as they 
comprise 80 per cent of humanity and their economic condition is far worse than that 
of advanced countries. 
 
 
II.  POVERTY AND EMPLOYMENT: ACHIEVEMENT AND CHALLENGE 
 
Confronted with the enormous current and accumulated developmental problems of 
the poor countries, it is easy to lose sight of the achievement which humanity has 
made in alleviating poverty and deprivation during the last half century.  It is therefore 
important to consider the economic and social progress which has been made during 
this period in a historical perspective.  This is not just an academic point but one 
which has a enduring policy relevance.  Apart from drawing policy lessons from past 
experience, historical perspective can also point towards possibilities for the future.          
 
II.1.  Economic and social progress in developing countries in historical perspective 
 
During the second half of the twentieth century developing countries as a whole made 
unprecedented economic progress.  Taking advantage of the propitious circumstances 
which opened up at the end of the Second World War, these countries embarked 
effectively on an industrial revolution.
2
  Between 1950 - 1980 they made remarkable 
economic and industrial progress.  In statistical terms during this period, the 130 or so 
developing countries (the South) with over 3.5 billion people expanded their 
production at an annual growth rate of nearly 5.5 per cent per annum, thus achieving a 
nearly fivefold increase in total output.  The South’s growth rate during this period 
was ten times higher than its own growth rate in the previous half century; it surpassed 
the growth rate achieved in the advanced countries’ (the North’s) industrial revolution 
in the 19
th
 century (1820 - 1900).  The South recorded the same proportionate increase 
in production as the North did during its period of rapid industrialisation, but the 
South accomplished this in half the time, at twice the growth rates and with five times 
the North’s population in the 19th century.3  
 
                                                 
2
   The propitious circumstances included political independence of a large number of developing 
countries; the contention between two systems - the US-led liberal capitalism and the USSR-led state-
planning system under party direction - which provided aid as well as space for developing countries to 
industrialise quickly and achieve faster economic growth.  See further Singh (1995).   
3
   The source of the statistics used in this and the following paragraphs is Patel (1995, 1996). 
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Patel (1995) provides data to show that, in the four decades following World War II, 
the South as a whole achieved an even more spectacular advance in the social field 
than in the economic field. This is evidenced by the following:  
 
1. Infant mortality rate (IMR)  in the South fell in the past four       decades 
from about 250 to 70 per thousand. Eighteen South countries with a 
combined population of 1.5 billion have already reached the IMR of only 30 
per thousand, current in the West up to the 1950s. 
 
2.  Life expectancy rose from around 35 years to 60-70 years by the late 1980s. 
The South has thereby added 25-35 years to the average life of each of its 
newly born citizens - or doubled the average life span. Everywhere 
women’s life expectation rose more than that of men. 
 
3.  In the mid-19th century, literacy rates in the North ranged from about 60 per 
cent in England and the US to a low of 20 per cent in Spain and  10 per cent 
in Italy. The average in the North was probably not more than 25 per cent in 
1850 and 50 per cent in 1900. The comparable level in the South was 
approximately 30 per cent in 1950. However by the 1980s, it had risen to 50 
per cent in Africa, 70 per cent in Asia and 80 per cent in Latin America.
4
  
 
4. In 1960 the advanced countries had 56 per cent of the world total gross 
number of literate persons with only 44 per cent in the developing countries. 
By 1985 the South’s share had risen to 69 per cent and that of the North had 
reduced to 31 per cent. It should be pointed out that within the afore-
mentioned statistics there was a far larger proportion of male literates than 
female literates - a fact which is still true nowadays and needs to be addressed. 
 
 
II.2.  Regional differences and changes over time in poverty levels  
 
Although economic growth is not the only determinant of poverty, there is 
nevertheless a negative relationship between the two variables. The fast growth of 
GDP in developing countries during this post WWII period resulted in sizeable 
reductions in poverty.  Chart 1 shows the impressive results for the most populous 
Asian countries in reducing “income poverty” - the proportion of people whose 
income fall below the official poverty line.
5
  Particularly striking in this respect is the 
record of Indonesia.  In 1970, over 60 percent of the Indonesian population was living 
below the poverty line; by 1996 the proportion had fallen to 12 percent.  This is quite 
remarkable, especially if one considers the fact that the country’s population rose from 
117 million to 200 million during this period.   
                                                 
4
  Literacy levels are of course difficult to compare over countries and over time, and literates in the 
North may be much more literate than those in the South. Nevertheless, the statement in the text is 
indicative of more trends.  
5
   Poverty and social deprivation can be defined in many different ways.  The simplest and the most 
widely used measure is the proportion of people whose income fall below the cut off income level.  In 
their empirical work reported in the Human Development Reports, the UNDP provides a more 
comprehensive definition of poverty which includes deficits in three areas: longevity, knowledge and a 
decent standard of living. 
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The Latin American countries also achieved sizeable reductions in poverty during the 
1950s, 1960s and 1970s.  However, in the 1980s poverty increased in Latin America 
as a consequence of the prolonged debt crisis.  Poverty also rose in that decade in Sub-
Saharan Africa.  These inter-regional differences as well as inter-temporal changes in 
poverty levels broadly reflect the regional differences in GDP growth rates as well as 
how they have changed over time (see Chart 2).  Chart 2 indicates that the GDP 
growth rate of Latin America and Sub-Saharan African countries collapsed in the 
1980s whilst those of East Asian countries rose even higher from their already high 
levels.   
 
Despite the rapid progress made by Asian countries in reducing the incidence of 
poverty, South Asia continues to have the highest incidence of poverty in the world 
with over 40 percent of the people living below the dollar-a-day poverty line.  After 
South Asia, the highest incidence of poverty is in Sub-Saharan Africa.  What the most 
recent estimates show is that the 266 million of its 590 million people are living below 
the national poverty line.  UNDP (1997) reports that the depth of poverty, i.e. how far 
incomes fall below the poverty line, is greater in Sub-Saharan Africa than in other 
regions. 
 
The information provided in Table 1 suggests that the immediate challenge of poverty 
before humanity is the 1.3 billion people who earn less than a dollar-a-day per person 
at 1985 purchasing power parity. Table 2 indicates the social dimension of this 
challenge: there are close to a billion adults who are unable to read or write; three 
quarters of a billion people have no access to health services; 1.2 million people lack 
access to safe water and more than half a million people have a life expectation of less 
than forty years.  
 
 
II.3 Gender Gap 
 
Table 3 provides information on some indicators of the gender gap for different 
regions, for all developing countries together and for the world as a whole. Focusing 
on developing countries the table indicates that the adult literacy rate is sixteen 
percentage points higher for men than for women. UNDP (1997) notes that female 
school enrolment even at the primary level is 13 per cent lower than the male 
enrolment. Women’s share of earned income is a third of the total whilst that of men 
is two thirds. Importantly in UNDP (1997) reports that gender inequality is not always 
associated with “income poverty”. It is however strongly correlated with “human 
poverty” which, as noted earlier in footnote 4, is a more comprehensive measure than 
“income poverty”, as it includes in addition indicators of social deprivation. Other 
aspects of the gender gap will be taken up below. 
 
 
III.  World Employment, Unemployment and Under-employment 
 
The ILO’s World Employment Report for 1998-1999 estimated that prior to the Asian 
crisis there were 140 billion people in the world who were involuntarily unemployed, 
i.e. they were available and willing to work but could not find employment. In 
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addition, a quarter to a third of the global labour force of three billion were thought to 
be under-employed - “either working substantially less than full time, but wishing to 
work longer, or earning less than a living wage”. (ILO 1998, p.9). 
 
III.1 Advanced Economies 
 
The employment situation in advanced countries comprising the EU is very serious. 
Sixty years after the Great Depression, during the last decade, many of these countries 
have again been experiencing mass unemployment. There are 18 million people 
unemployed in the EU countries, constituting 10 per cent of the labour force. There is 
double digit unemployment in leading EU countries - Germany, France, Italy and 
Spain. Further it is estimated that if the workers who are too discouraged to even seek 
jobs because of large scale unemployment, as well as those who are working short 
hours involuntarily are added, it would raise the unemployment figures by another 50 
per cent. 
 
In the context of this mass unemployment it is important to remember that not too 
long ago, during the 1950s and 60s, countries like France and Germany not only 
enjoyed full employment but, in fact, had over full employment. Table 5 shows, for 
example, that the average rate of unemployment in the ten years 1964 - 73 was less 
than 1 per cent of the labour force. Moreover in addition to employing their own 
indigenous labour force, France and Germany also provided employment to a very 
large number of immigrant workers who constituted almost 10 per cent of the labour 
force. This raises an obvious but nevertheless extremely important question: if full 
employment was possible twenty years ago why is it not possible today in these 
countries? 
 
III.2 Developing Countries 
 
Turning to developing countries, Table 4 would seem to suggest that the recorded 
rates of unemployment in these countries are quite low. This is literally true but the 
inference that there are very few people who are involuntarily unemployed is 
misleading. This phenomenon arises from the fact that these countries are unable to 
provide public provision of insurance against unemployment, so that those who are 
unemployed are obliged to work (often in the informal sector) however 
unremunerative the work may be. Thus for developing countries the problem of 
unemployment manifests itself mainly in the form of ‘disguised’ unemployment (i.e. 
work with very low productivity or return) or under-employment. Therefore, the 
question of unemployment in the case of the developing countries must be considered 
in conjunction with that of productivity growth and under-employment. 
 
These points are well illustrated by Table 6 which provides information on economic 
activity, employment and real wages for Latin American countries from 1980 - 1995. 
The table indicates that although the rate of open unemployment has only been 7 - 8 
per cent in the 1990s, there has been huge increase in informal sector employment. 
Tokman (1997) estimates that 8 out of every 10 new jobs created during this period 
have been low paying jobs in the informal sector. There has thus been an 
informalisation of the Latin American labour market, with a proportion of informal 
sector jobs increasing from about 40 per cent in 1980 to over 55 per cent in 1995. It is 
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interesting that although the Latin American economies have been growing during the 
1990s following the resumption of capital flows, there has been no increase in real 
wages since 1980. Minimum wages in 1995 were 30 per cent below what they were in 
1980. 
 
The contrast with the evolution of the East Asian labour markets during the same 
period could not be more striking. In these countries as Table 7 indicates there has 
been a sizeable increase in real wages, to the order of 5 per cent per annum. Further, 
evidence suggests that the increase in employment which has occurred has taken place 
the formal sector and the size of the informal sector has in fact shrunk as a 
consequence in some countries. Thus the East Asian countries before the present crisis 
were able to create not only enough jobs for those who needed them but created good 
jobs with rising real wages. Indeed, prior to the crisis, some of these hitherto labour 
surplus economies found themselves with labour shortages and began to employ a 
considerable number of immigrant workers from neighbouring countries. 
 
 
III.3  Gender Gap 
 
The more reliable and more complete information on the gender gap in the labour 
markets is unfortunately available only for advanced economies. (See Tables 8 and 9). 
The most relevant points for this paper may be summarised as follows: 
 
1.  Over the last twenty years female employment has increased at a much faster rate 
than male employment. Nevertheless a greater proportion of women are 
involuntarily unemployed than men. 
  
2.  There has been a huge increase in labour force participation rates of women while 
that for men has declined. Between 1973 - 1992 the average male participation 
rates in OECD Europe fell by nearly a quarter while the female rates increased by a 
quarter. (See Table 8). 
 
3.  The earnings gap between men and women is considerably lower now in industrial 
countries than it was twenty years ago. (see Table 9). 
 
Thus, though there has been progress over the last two decades in closing the gender 
gap, important differences in the treatment of men and women in the labour market in 
all these areas still remain.
6
 
 
It has been suggested that the fact that men have been losing jobs or withdrawing from 
the labour market while women have been increasing participation and gaining jobs 
implies that women’s gains have been at the expense of men. However as Howes and 
Singh (1995) note this generalisation is not valid. They argue that given a persistent 
gender division of labour, mass unemployment in advanced countries is due to 
                                                 
6
 The above summary of the gender gap in the labour market refers only to a few areas central to the 
subject of this paper - the issue of poverty. For more comprehensive analyses of the gender gap, see 
among others UNDP (1997, 1998), Beneria and Feldman (1992), Dex (1985), Folbre (1994), Jenson, 
Hagen and Reddy (1988a), Rowthorn (1992) and Singh (1987a). 
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different forces operating on men and women. The rate of the growth of men’s jobs 
has fallen because of de-industrialisation but men have not withdrawn from the labour 
force at a comparable rate. Women have been entering the labour force in “feminised” 
jobs, usually in the low-paying service sector, at a faster rate than such jobs have 
materialised. 
 
Turning to developing countries, in an influential paper, Standing (1989) advanced the 
theory of the “feminisation” of the labour force in the South. The essential argument is 
that much as in advanced countries, in the poor countries as well, there has been an 
appreciable increase in female participation rates while male rates have declined. 
Standing attributes this to increased international competition as well as structural 
adjustment policies in developing countries which he believes have worsened income 
distribution. This has obliged women to enter the labour force to supplement the 
family income. Employers have been equally keen to substitute cheap, non-unionised 
and more flexible female labour for the more expensive male labour. The feminisation 
thesis, however, is controversial; there is some dispute about facts but more so about 
the interpretation of the evidence.
7
 
 
 
III.3. Conclusion 
 
To sum up, this analysis and review of the available information on poverty and 
employment issues, particularly in relation to the developing countries (prior to the 
Asian crisis),  has shown that these countries, when considered from an historical 
perspective, have made enormous economic and social progress in the last fifty years. 
There is, however, a great deal still to be done if the minimum standards of decent life 
are to be provided to a billion people who presently fall below that standard. The 
complementary task of providing adequately remunerative jobs for all those who need 
them is also a large one. But neither of these objectives is hopeless, as the record of 
developing countries as a whole during the period 1950 - 1980, and that of Asian 
countries in the last two decades before the crisis, suggests.  
 
The next section will discuss the effects of the Asian crisis on poverty and 
employment. It will be seen that the analysis of these effects makes the task of poverty 
alleviation and meeting the employment needs of the people more complicated but it 
does not change the essential picture outlined above. 
 
 
IV The Asian Crisis: Consequences for Poverty and Employment 
 
Due to the proximity of the crisis, precise information on its social consequences in 
the most affected Asian countries will not be available for some time. Nevertheless 
some of the best available estimates from the World bank on poverty, real wages and 
employment are summarised in Table 10 and Chart 3. These suggest that assuming no 
change in the distribution of income and using $1 a day poverty line for Indonesia and 
the Philippines and $2 a day for Malaysian and Thailand, 17 million more people in 
Indonesia will have fallen below the poverty line in 1998, 2.3 million more in 
                                                 
7
 See further Elson (1995), Cagatay and Ozler (1995), Hughes and Singh (1995). 
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Thailand, 665,000 in the Philippines and just under half a million in Malaysia. Poverty 
figures are very sensitive to deterioration in income distribution as well as to the 
definition of the poverty line. Since many people in a country like Indonesia live only 
slightly above the $1 a day poverty line, an increase in the poverty line to $1.25 a day 
would raise the number of additional poor people to 22 million, bringing the total 
number to 56.5 million. The World Bank also estimates that a 10 per cent worsening 
in the distribution of income, which past experience with crises in other countries 
suggest is more than likely, would bring the incidence of poverty in most countries 
back to the level of the early 1990s, practically eliminating the effects of ten years of 
growth. 
 
With respect to unemployment, the bank estimates suggest that the number 
unemployed will have risen to about 13 million in Indonesia by the end of 1998, 3.5 
million in Thailand and 1.6 million in Korea, a total of 18 million. This may be 
compared with a pre-crisis figure of 5.3 million for the three countries together in 
1996. 
 
It may also be worth noting that these figures may well turn out to be the lower bound 
estimates, e.g. the Indonesian government itself thought that there would be 20 million 
unemployed by the end of 1998. Estimates of unemployment by different agencies and 
organisations vary in part due to the different assumptions which are made as to what 
proportion of the workers laid off are absorbed in the informal sector in the rural and 
urban areas. 
 
As one would expect, not only has the crisis led to increased open unemployment and 
a sharp decrease in wages, there will also have been a huge increase in the already 
high incidence of under-employment. Real wages are expected to fall in Indonesia by 
40 to 60 per cent in 1998 and by over 10 per cent in Thailand. The Indonesian figure is 
considerably higher than that suffered by the worst affected Latin American countries 
after the debt crisis of the 1980s. (See Table 10) 
 
Apart from these effects of the crisis on poverty, employment and real wages, areas in 
which governments typically collect statistical data, there are other social 
consequences, just as important, on which less data is available or which are not 
quantifiable at all. For example it would not be an exaggeration to suggest that the 
crisis in Indonesia has been so deep that it has damaged the social fabric of the whole 
society. There has been serious unrest and severe persecution of the Chinese minority 
which may have repercussions well beyond Indonesia. 
 
Further, even relatively short periods of  economic contraction  can have long term 
effects on people’s well-being. It is well documented that brief periods of malnutrition 
for children may result in long term damage to their mental and physical potential, 
even if after economic recovery nutrition improves. Joseph Stiglitz, the Chief 
Economist of the World Bank, cites reports from Indonesia and Thailand that millions 
of children are not returning for the 1998 school year, as their parents are unable to 
afford the school fees, other educational costs or even spare their children’s time. 
Similarly the destruction or degradation of human capital involved in prolonged  lay-
off is yet another social cost. This cost is not properly measured, if at all, by 
economists and government statisticians. 
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Turning to the gender implications of the crisis there is evidence that women in the 
affected countries, despite all the discriminations to which they are traditionally 
subjected, did share in the economic and social gains arising from fast economic 
growth for a long period. There are studies which suggest some improvement in 
women’s position in the labour market. However as the World Bank (1998) observes: 
 
“But women and girls may be disproportionately hurt by the financial crisis. Women 
lose their jobs first, and families pull their daughters out of school before sons. The 
particularly hard pressed may sell daughters to brothels. Even before the crisis, girls in 
Indonesia were six times more likely than boys to drop out of school before the fourth 
grade. Once girls are removed from school, they rarely go back. Social organisations 
also point to a rise in domestic violence and prostitution. Though gender inequality is 
not a new problem in the region, the crisis situation has exacerbated the difficulties 
faced by poor women and girls in East Asia”. 
 
Finally, the Asian Crisis is not only not yet over even for the Asian countries but its 
reverberations are still spreading to other developing countries and regions. The latest 
victim is Brazil where the value of the real has fallen 40 per cent over the last two 
months. The Economist (6
th
 March 1999, p.99) reports that even the  normally 
optimistic Brazilian officials estimate that GDP will shrink this year by 4 per cent. 
The January 1999 unemployment figure of 8 per cent was the worst since 1983, when 
records began. Further, despite a deep recession, prices rose by nearly 4 per cent in 
February 1999. In addition, the new agreement between the Brazilian government and 
the IMF is likely to call for a bigger fiscal squeeze to ensure a public sector ‘primary’ 
surplus (before interest payments) of more than 3 per cent of GDP this year. This 
would entail more spending cuts probably including important items in the social 
sphere. 
 
 
V  Poverty, Employment and Long Term Economic Growth 
 
V.1 Short and Long Term Policy Issues 
 
The policy questions raised by the previous discussion are: 
 
a.  What should be done in the short term to cope with the  
economic and social consequences of the Asian crisis; 
 
b. What kind of policies are required in the long term to promote employment 
and to eliminate human poverty around the globe at least in the narrow 
material sense indicated earlier? 
 
It will however be best to start first with the analytical and empirical issues connected 
with poverty alleviation and the expansion of adequately remunerative employment.  
Short term policy issues will be considered later. 
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V.2 Poverty - Employment - Growth Nexus: Analytical and Empirical Considerations 
 
At the microeconomic level there is an obvious relationship between poverty and 
employment. A reasonably remunerative job will help keep a family out of poverty. At 
the macroeconomic level, the relationship between these variables is still close but 
much less obvious. It is indirect and the linkage is provided through the intervening 
variable of economic growth. The creation of sufficient employment opportunities 
with adequate levels of real wages requires a reasonable rate of economic growth; so 
does the eradication of poverty and meeting the minimum basic needs of the people. 
The causal mechanism in each case is however somewhat different; these will be 
elaborated below.  
 
V.2a Poverty and Growth 
 
Although at any moment of time a redistribution of incomes may enable a society to 
better meet the basic needs of its poorest people, this can only be done on a 
sustainable basis if there is a continuing expansion of the national economy. 
Economic growth increases household incomes, and as will be explained in greater 
detail below, it also generates more jobs. Further, it increases government revenues 
which may be spent on health, education, clear water supplies and other basic needs of 
the people. 
 
Empirical evidence indicates a robust negative relationship between poverty and 
economic growth. This was an important reason why the East Asian region 
experienced such a sharp reduction in poverty over the last two decades. This is also 
the reason why with slow growth during the 1980s poverty rose in Latin America as 
well as Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
Although there is an overall negative relationship between poverty and economic 
growth, it is by no means a perfect relationship. The responsiveness of poverty to 
growth varies between countries. Assuming distributional neutrality, studies suggest 
that in the late 1980s, in Malaysia and in Thailand, a 1 per cent increase in growth in 
mean incomes was associated with a 3.5 per cent reduction in poverty; in Indonesia 
the corresponding value of elasticity was 2.8 per cent; it was less than 2 per cent in 
most of Sub-Saharan Africa and less than 1 per cent in Brazil. The essential reason for 
the differences in the values of these elasticities is that growth is not the only 
determinant of poverty: the latter also depends importantly on a host of other variables  
including for example: distribution of income, inflation, and employment elasticity of 
growth (i.e. whether growth is more or less labour intensive). Thus it is not growth 
alone, but also its characteristics which affect poverty. 
8
 Factors other than growth 
which also influence poverty will be commented on in the next section. 
 
V 2.b Employment, Growth and Productivity in Developing Countries 
 
                                                 
8
 See further World Bank (1998),see also World Bank (1993), Demerey, Sen and Vishwanath (1995), 
Ahuja et al (1997), Watkins (1998), Ranis and Stewart (1999) 
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Turning to employment, for developing countries, as noted earlier, the problem of 
unemployment manifests itself mainly in the form of low productivity, low wage, 
“disguised” unemployment or under-employment. Nevertheless, many countries in 
Latin America and SSA have been experiencing relatively high rates of open 
unemployment as well as massive under-employment. The main employment 
challenge facing these countries is however much more formidable than just meeting 
the employment needs of those who are currently unemployed or under-employed. 
The challenge lies in the fact that the labour force in many of these countries in these 
two regions is growing at approximately 3 per cent a year.  
 
Before the Asian crisis, the employment situation in South East and East Asia was 
much more promising. The labour markets were tight, productivity was growing at a 
fast pace and workers were enjoying rising real wages. Moreover, the expected rate of 
growth of the labour force was considerably lower than in Latin America and the SSA. 
But even here there are potentially difficult problems for the populous countries such 
as Indonesia and China. These arise from the fact that in these countries a large 
proportion of the population is still employed in low productivity agriculture. To raise 
productivity agriculture needs to shed labour but it can only do so if there is a 
sufficient increase in remunerative employment opportunities in urban industry and 
services.  
 
Thus even before the Asian crisis most developing countries faced an awesome 
employment problem. Although in general there is a positive relationship between 
employment and growth, in the case of developing countries, it must be carefully 
interpreted. Employment in the formal sector normally expands only in response to the 
growth or the expected growth of output; in the informal sector, however, it may 
expand without any expansion of output. Informal sector employment may indeed 
expand even more with a decline in output which lowers incomes and obliges more 
people to engage in informal employment in order to maintain family income. It is 
therefore important in considering the relationship between output and employment in 
developing countries to also consider the inter-relationship of the two variables with 
productivity.  
 
The aggregate data on output, employment and productivity in Table 11 for three 
developing regions illustrates some of these points. It shows that employment 
expanded at a faster rate in Latin America than in Asia during both periods (the mid 
1970s - 1984, 1985 - the early 1990s) but in Latin America it was associated with 
falling or more or less stagnant productivity, whereas in Asia productivity rose at a 
creditable rate of 3 per cent or more per annum. In the second period in SSA, the rate 
of growth and employment was only 1.5 per cent compared with a labour force growth 
rate of about 3 per cent and productivity was stagnant. This would suggest that 
African countries had the worst of both worlds: neither sufficient employment 
expansion even in the informal sector nor any productivity growth.
9
 
 
Studies based on the period 1950 - 1980 when developing countries as a whole 
enjoyed fast economic growth suggest that in order for employment to increase at a 
                                                 
9
 This data pertains to a sample of eight countries in SSA, ten countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, nine countries in South and East Asia. See further Pieper (1998). 
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rate of 3 percent per annum to meet the needs of new entrants to the labour force, 
GDP must increase on average at about 5-6 per cent per annum so as to be able to 
maintain the share of labour in total income. This would entail a rise in the long term 
rate of growth of productivity and real wages of the order of 2-3 per cent per annum. 
This conclusion is also compatible with the more recent data in Table 11. 
Coincidentally, UNDP (1997) has estimated that in order to eliminate poverty over the 
next two decades, developing countries need to grow at a rate of 6 per cent per annum.  
 
These considerations suggest that a trend rate of growth of 6 per cent per annum for 
developing countries may be regarded as the minimum socially necessary rate which 
would both remove poverty and meet the employment needs of a rapidly growing 
labour force. However, if the existing unemployment and under-employment is also to 
be reduced, the growth in GDP would need to be higher still.  
 
 
V.2.c Unemployment , Labour Markets and Economic Growth in Advanced Countries 
 
It was seen earlier that European countries are experiencing mass unemployment in 
the 1990s, yet less than twenty five years ago they had a prolonged period (‘golden 
age’) of not just full employment but over-full employment in a number of countries. 
The main difference between these two periods is not labour market which some 
international financial institutions claim as being the main reason for the current mass 
unemployment in Europe. The labour markets were if anything less flexible in the 
‘golden age’ than they have been subsequently. The essential reason for Europe’s 
outstanding employment performance in the earlier period was the much faster growth 
of the West European economy. Between 1950 - 1973 these countries expanded at a 
historically unprecedented rate of nearly 5 per cent per annum whilst since 1974 the 
long term trend rate of growth of the European economies has fallen to half that 
figure. 
 
The international financial institutions also invoke the flexibility of the US labour 
market compared with that of the West European market to suggest why there is more 
or less full employment in the US and high unemployment in Europe. There is a 
kernel of truth in this argument in that the lower US unemployment rate is indeed 
partly due to the lack of public provision for the relief of unemployment in the US 
relative to Western Europe. US workers are therefore obliged to take jobs, any jobs, 
regardless of how remunerative they may be. It is notable that there was no increase in 
the real wages of manual workers in the US between 1973 - 1993. 
 
A little reflection will show that nevertheless the labour market flexibility argument is 
inadequate to account for the differing unemployment experiences of Western Europe 
and the US. To see this, consider for example labour markets and employment in 
West Germany and the US. The former has a comparatively inflexible labour market, 
but this is not only true today, it was also so in the ‘golden age’. However, in the 
‘golden age’, West Germany managed to achieve full employment while the US did 
not. Moreover, the growth of real wages in West Germany in this earlier period was 
considerably faster than in the US. The key to this puzzle lies in the fact that West 
Germany in that period was growing much faster than either its current rate, or that of 
the US (whether now or in the earlier period). 
 14 
 
As noted in Singh (1995), the same difficulty with the labour market flexibility 
hypothesis arises in explaining the differences in levels of unemployment between the 
Great Depression and the Post War period. The labour market was much more flexible 
in the earlier compared with the subsequent period . Matthews and Bowen (1998) 
show that real product wages rose far more in the 1950s and 1960s in the UK 
compared with the 1930s, yet the earlier period had the Great Depression and the later 
period more or less full employment. 
 
Returning to the present case of the US economy, it is important to note that a major 
blemish in the US economic record is that, although labour markets appear to be tight 
and there are high levels of unemployment, real wages have hardly risen at all in the 
last twenty five years. Both productivity growth and per capita income growth, though 
not as slow as wage growth, have been well below that of the major OECD countries. 
(Howes and Singh,1995) This has meant that the normal expectation of the American 
people, that each generation’s standard of living will be twice that of the previous one, 
is no longer being realised. 
 
Howes and Singh (forthcoming) argue that the main reason for the stagnation of real 
wages in the US, like that of the high unemployment rates in Europe is that the 
economy in the post - 1973 period has been expanding at a lower long term rate than 
before.
10
 Between 1960 and 1973 US GDP grew at an annual rate of 4 per cent, 
compared with 2.3 per cent since 1973. The higher growth rate of the earlier period 
not only enabled the country to have a better employment record than it has done 
subsequently; more significantly it also made it possible for real wages to increase at a 
rate of about 2 per cent per annum in that period.
11
 
 
Thus to meet the historic aspirations of US citizens, it is not enough for the economy 
to generate high levels of employment, it must do so with growing real wages. This 
can, however, only be accomplished if there is a trend increase in the post-1973 long 
term growth rate of the US economy, to the rates that were experienced in the 1950s. 
 
Lastly and incidentally it is also useful to reflect upon the fact that the broad 
experience of developing countries since 1980 also provides little support for the 
labour market flexibility thesis. During the 1980s, workers in Latin America saw 
sizeable reductions in their wages and also increasing unemployment. In Mexico, for 
example, real wages fell by 50 per cent between 1980 and 1988. This was 
accompanied by a much slower, rather than a faster, growth of modern sector 
employment than before and increasing informalisation of the economy. In contrast, in 
                                                 
10
 Due to the fact that productivity growth is so much higher in Europe than in the US, the consequence 
of equally slow rates of growth in the two regions has been high unemployment in Europe and full 
employment with stagnant real wages for the US. Given the differences in labour market institutions, to 
achieve full employment in Europe would require rates of growth comparable to those of the ‘golden 
age’ in the range of 5 per cent annually. The US can achieve full employment at lower rates of growth 
productivity growth is so low. However, rising standards of living will require higher rates of 
productivity growth. 
11
 The average real earnings for non-supervisory workers in the US declined at a rate of 0.6 per cent per 
annum in the 1970s, I per cent in the 1980s and 0.6 per cent per annum between 1990 and 1995. In 
contrast in the 1950s and 1960s the corresponding average real earnings rose at a rate of 2 per cent per 
annum (Mishel, Bernstein and Schmitt, 1997). 
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the East and South East Asian newly industrialising countries, in the last fifteen years 
real wages increased at a rate of 5 per cent a year and so did modern sector 
employment. It would be difficult to ascribe the very different employment records of 
the Asian and Latin American newly industrialising countries (NICs) in the 1980s and 
1990s to the relative flexibility or inflexibility of their labour markets. Rather these 
differences arose from the fact that the Asian NICs expanded at a much faster rate 
than the Latin American ones during that period. 
 
 
 
VI  Technology, Jobless Growth and other Determinants of Employment and 
Poverty 
 
VI.1  Technology and Employment 
 
The thesis outlined above suggests that in order to meet the employment needs of the 
people and to reduce poverty it is necessary to have a trend increase in the rate of 
growth of production in both developed and developing countries. There is however a 
very important objection to this thesis which needs careful consideration. This relates 
to the role of technology. 
 
With widespread redundancies ,the “downsizing” of businesses and job insecurity 
throughout the industrial world, it is commonplace to blame technology for these 
events. It is argued that the main reason for unemployment is the much faster pace of 
technological progress which results in replacing people by machines. 
 
However, evidence at least at the aggregate macro-economic level suggests that this 
argument is hard to sustain either for developed or developing countries. The 
following points are relevant. 
1)  Evidence for industrial countries suggests there has been a trend reduction in their 
rate of growth of productivity during the last fifteen to twenty years rather than a 
trend increase. Productivity growth during this period has been half of what it was 
during the 1950s and 60s when there was full employment. Had the pace of 
technical progress been actually faster, there would have been an improvement in 
the average  productivity growth rather than the substantial observed decline.  So 
although in individual industries faster technical progress may have caused 
redundancies, this factor cannot account for the overall observed increase in 
unemployment in industrial countries. 
 
2)  A variation on the above theme is the argument about “jobless growth”.  The 
suggestion here is that because of the nature of technical change, economic growth 
no longer creates jobs. This proposition may be put in a less extreme form in the 
economist’s jargon as suggesting that the employment elasticity of growth has 
fallen. Evidence, however, does not back up this claim.  
 
The data for industrial countries  shows that the growth rate required before the 
economy starts creating net new jobs has been less in the period 1974 to 1995 than 
during 1960 to 1973.  This reflects the lower average productivity growth of the 
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later period.
12
  In the US for example the annual growth rate required for the 
economy to start creating net additional jobs during 1960-1973 was 2.3 per cent; 
between 1974-1995, the corresponding rate has only been 0.7per cent.  
 
 Further, cross-section econometric evidence for advanced industrial countries 
suggests, if anything, an increase over time in the employment elasticity of output 
growth rather than a decrease, as the hypothesis of jobless growth would imply. 
Boltho and Glyn(1995) report that employment elasticity of GDP growth for 
advanced industrial countries rose from 0.49 per cent during 1975-82 to 0.63per 
cent during 1982-93. The reason why unemployment or under-employment has 
increased so steeply in all these countries  is not that ‘growth’ does not create as 
many jobs as before, but that there has been much slower growth than before. 
 
3)  The above argument about the alleged negative role of technology is much more 
plausible for advanced countries than for developing countries which are not on the 
cutting edge of technology. Nevertheless, in developing countries there is no 
evidence of any significant reductions in the employment elasticity of output over 
time. There are however some anomalies in this area which require comment. First, 
in the case of Latin American countries it has been noted that although economic 
growth resumed in the 1990s employment has not increased at the same rate as 
before. This implied reduction in employment elasticity is however not attributed 
to technology but to liberalisation of trade which these countries have undertaken 
(Frenkel 1998). The other case of apparently falling employment elasticity relates 
to India where this elasticity is estimated to have fallen quite considerably in the 
formal manufacturing sector. This phenomena has not been adequately studied. But 
a reasonable hypothesis would be that it is due to internal liberalisation and de-
regulation of the Indian economy. There has also been external liberalisation in the 
1980s and 90s but this has not been any where as extensive as in Latin America. 
However, the internal de-regulation and the end of the “permit Raj” has been more 
far reaching. 
  
4)  Finally, there is a paradox about the role of technology with respect to current 
economic events. Scholars in this area regard information and communications 
technology as representing a new technical paradigm, on a par with the steam 
engine and electricity, as being among the most significant technological 
revolutions of the last two centuries.  The fact that despite the availability of this 
revolutionary new technology, productivity growth has fallen rather than improved, 
suggests that its potential is not being realised. Closer analysis indicates that this 
can be ascribed to insufficient growth of aggregate real demand and output.
13
 If the 
rate of growth of real aggregate demand was higher, this technology would have 
more widespread use in most branches of industry and services, reducing their 
prices and as in the case of previous technical revolutions leading to a virtuous 
circle of increased demand and increased growth of productivity. In short, the 
unutilised potential of the ICT revolution suggests that the rate of growth of GDP 
in industrial countries is certainly not constrained by supply. If there are 
constraints, it is to the factors on the demand side that we should look. 
                                                 
12
  See further, ILO(1996). 
13
 For a fuller discussion of these issues see Singh (1997), Howes and Singh (forthcoming) 
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VI.2   Determinants of Poverty other than Growth 
 
As noted in Section V there are important determinants of poverty other than growth 
which need to be considered in formulating policy. Research on questions of poverty 
suggest that the most important of these are the following: 
 
a.  Rate of inflation. 
b.  Income distribution. 
c.  Initial distribution of land and other assets. 
d.  Stability of economic growth. 
e.  The governments fiscal policies. 
 
Briefly, studies for both Asian and Latin American countries suggest that other things 
being equal, inflation  and specifically unanticipated inflation hurt the poor. In the 
recent period there is evidence from Latin America that stabilisation of prices leads to 
an increase in the standard of living of the poor, which accounts for the electoral 
popularity of stabilisation programmes such as those undertaken in Argentina under 
President Menem and in Brazil under President Cordoso when he was the Finance 
Minister in the previous government. 
 
Arguably from a gender perspective, the most significant of these additional factors 
which affect poverty is economic instability, i.e. the frequency and the amplitude of 
the economic cycles. Most developing countries do not have, and are unlikely to have 
for a long time, a publicly provided social security system. The burden of coping with 
unemployment and reduced wages in cyclical downturns therefore falls on the families 
and  hence on  women. 
 
Finally, public policy and government expenditure patterns with respect to education, 
health and other social fields clearly have a major impact on poverty and deprivation.  
 
 
VII Long Term Policy to Achieve Full Employment and Eliminate Poverty 
 
The above analysis has shown that in order to reduce global poverty, unemployment 
and under-employment it is necessary to have fast, stable (i.e. non-fluctuating) and 
non-inflationary economic growth. It is also important to have a re-distributive fiscal 
policy. The important long term policy question is therefore how developing countries 
can achieve such socially necessary minimum growth rates as well as the right kind of 
growth. Similarly, in order to remove the scourge of mass unemployment and to 
restore full employment, what policy and/or institutional changes are required for 
industrial countries to return to the pace of growth they achieved in the golden age? 
However before these policy questions can be satisfactorily addressed, there is a prior 
question of feasibility. Are such growth rates feasible for either group of countries?  It 
has been demonstrated in detail elsewhere that the answer to this question is in 
principle an affirmative one. (See references in footnote 13.) 
 
As noted earlier, because of the existence of the large backlog of unutilized ICT 
technology and its unrealised potential, the constraints on industrial country growth lie 
 18 
on the demand rather than the supply side. Thus there is the technology and the 
resources to achieve these crucial objectives. To the extent that failure on the demand 
side prevents the achievement of these objectives, it is a self-inflicted wound arising 
from the lack of success in creating the necessary economic coordinating mechanisms 
and institutions. Similarly, the socially necessary growth rates are perfectly feasible on 
the supply side for developing countries in Asia and Latin America.
14
 Despite their 
underdevelopment, most of these countries now have the necessary organisational 
capacity and technical skills to achieve such growth. The fact that they have a lot of 
catching up to do may also be to their advantage. However, under liberalisation and 
globalisation, the main constraints on achieving socially necessary growth rates for 
these countries lie also on the demand side.  
 
To implement this programme of increasing the trend rate of growth of real demand in 
the world economy on a sustainable basis requires action and institutional changes at 
the international and national levels.  
 
 
VII.1. International action to achieve faster growth of world production and 
employment 
 
 
VII. 1. a Industrial countries 
 
While the nation state has the primary in formulating and implementing development 
policies, they are greatly influenced by the activities  of the IFIs and the WTO, and to 
a lesser extent by other international organizations, such as the ILO.  The key policy 
question is how these institutions can help to raise the trend rate of world economic 
growth, as well as ensure that this growth is of the right kind, namely, that it is non-
inflationary, stable and one which creates work and benefits the poor? 
 
In discussing this issue, the first important point to note is that the international 
organizations can make a positive contribution in this endeavour by either doing the 
right things or, equally significantly, by refraining from doing the wrong things. This 
is particularly relevant for some of the IFIs whose main policy programme for dealing 
with the world employment problem has been based on the doctrine of labour market 
flexibility. They have, in effect, been fighting the last war (against inflation), and a 
fundamental change in their intellectual and policy perspectives, as well as their 
corporate culture, is required.   
 
Apart from the shortcomings discussed earlier, the labour market flexibility doctrine 
has unfortunately even more serious implications at the international level.  To the 
extent that significantly lower wages in one economy generate greater export demand 
from higher wage economies, this may pit workers in one country against those 
elsewhere and erode labour standards.  Importantly, it is likely to generate a conflict 
between workers in advanced countries and those in poor countries.  Even among the 
advanced countries, it could also ultimately lead to competitive devaluations of the 
                                                 
14
 The supply side constraints are morelikely to be applicable in the case of African countries. 
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kind which occurred in the 1930s and hence to greater instability in the international 
economy.  
 
Rejecting labour market flexibility as the most important response to the employment 
problem does not imply that certain specific rigidities such as high pay-roll taxes 
should not be relaxed.  However, even if one accepts that there is a downard sloping 
demand curve for labour, what is being suggested here is that a superior alternative 
strategy from a global perspective exists involving a shift of the curve to the right 
rather than moving along it.  This alternative strategy is the “high road” which 
international institutions should favour, rather than one moving down the demand 
curve which has dangerous potentialities for conflict.  
 
Unlike labour market flexibility, the alternative strategy of seeking a substantial 
increase in real world demand in order to increase world employment and production 
is a positive sum game.  Faster economic growth in rich countries would help poor 
countries in a variety of ways, for example, through increased demand for their 
products which should lead to faster output growth and employment.  The latter will 
in turn assist the advanced economies by positive feedback through, for example, 
greater demand for these countries’ products.    
 
It is, however, important to appreciate that increasing the growth of real demand today  
is not a matter of simply instituting expansionary fiscal and monetary policies.  It 
involves a much more complex and difficult task in the present circumstances of the 
world economy, as the experience of Japan and that of the crisis affected developing 
countries indicates.
15
   
 
Research indicates that the faster expansion of real aggregate demand and production 
in industrial countries cannot be achieved without deep institutional changes at both 
the international and national level.  Briefly, what is required at the international level 
is for: 
 
 chief priority to be given to the employment problem, rather than to
 inflation; 
 
 symmetrical adjustments to be made between deficit and surplus  countries;      
 
 macro-economic policy coordination to take place between leading 
 industrial countries via a multilateral mechanism. 
 
On the last point, it will be appreciated that this was the role originally intended for 
the IMF.  Instead, the organization has devoted itself over the last several decades to 
disciplining the South, rather than the main economic actors on the world stage.  A 
new international monetary institution today should be seeking the coordinated 
expansion of industrial country demand.   
 
However, to ensure that such multilaterally coordinated growth of world demand does 
not result in inflation as happened in the 1970s, it is necessary to have pay 
                                                 
15
 For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Krugman (1999). 
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coordinating mechanisms within the industrial countries, instead of policies of labour 
market flexibility and deregulation.  Experience suggests that such pay policies only 
work if they are seen not simply as a device to reduce workers’ real wages but are 
long-term and regarded as fair and redistributive in a progressive direction.  
 
 
VII.1.b Developing countries 
 
In relation to the crisis affected countries in Asia, it is now generally agreed that they 
are subject to an acute demand constraint. The external financing constraint to which 
these economies have become subject following the melt-down in financial markets 
has resulted in large parts of the productive capacity of these economies -- human as 
well as physical -- becoming unutilized.  An important and welcome change occurred 
in IMF policies, when rather late in the day, when they recognized the existence of a 
demand problem in the crisis affected countries. Their consequent relaxation of tight 
fiscal conditionality, as well as the acceptance of large safety net spending, does 
however also imply that the earlier policies imposed unnecessary hardship on the 
people. 
 
As far as long term policies are concerned, the IFIs need to go much further in this 
direction.  Specifically, it should be recognized that, faced with an acute financial 
crisis, in achieving adjustment it may be much less costly for production and 
employment to impose exchange and/or import controls, than rely on fiscal deflation.  
This point is acknowledged in the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, but in its 
enthusiasm for market supremacy over many years it has strongly discouraged resort 
to such policies.  As economics is not an exact science, the IMF should be willing to 
allow countries to adopt the measures they deem appropriate, particularly when faced 
with an acute crisis. 
 
It follows from this analysis that the IMF should be seen to be supporting and be 
helpful to the current Malaysian policy of mild capital controls.  It is arguable that had 
similar policies been followed in Indonesia at the outset of the crisis -- that is, the 
imposition of exchange and import controls -- rather than the IMF policies, the 
ensuing tragedy in that country may have been avoided.  The important point here is 
that there are long term lessons to be learned from IMF interventions in the Asian 
crisis.  International organizations which have a vital concern with economic and 
social development, and employment and welfare, need to continually analyse and 
assess objectively the macroeconomic policies pursued by different countries in 
varying circumstances.    
 
 
VII.2  Stability of economic growth 
 
Economic instability, let alone the melt-down which has occurred recently in East 
Asia, Brazil and Russia, has serious short and long term repercussions, particularly for 
the most disadvantaged sectors of the population.  As emphasized earlier, the main 
burden of instability in developing countries generally falls on women. How can 
developing countries therefore achieve the necessary stability in economic growth? 
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One of the most important reasons for instability in the recent period has been the 
operations of the international financial markets and specifically freer international 
capital flows between nations.  The IMF has been pursuing the objective of capital 
account liberalization in developing countries with missionary zeal. Two years ago it 
sought a change in its Articles of Agreement which would have formalized this 
objective and allowed it to pursue it with even greater vigour.  This is not 
withstanding the fact that leading economists, even in advanced countries, regard 
capital account liberalization as being of dubious value, carrying a palpable risk of 
harming developing countries.    
 
The IMF believes that capital account liberalization, by allowing markets to freely 
allocate capital, will help both rich and poor countries, especially the developing 
countries which in general are short of capital. However, empirical evidence shows 
that, under free competition, private capital does not flow into the developing 
countries that need it, but has flowed rather to those which already have a high savings 
ratio as well as export orientation and therefore need it least.  African countries which 
really do need external finance are unlikely to get it from this source. 
 
Financial markets today move at an incredible speed and are subject to alternating but 
unpredictable bouts of pessimism and optimism. This behaviour has been increasingly 
evident on stock markets, the foreign exchange markets and indeed asset markets of 
all kinds in recent years. Alan Greenspan’s analyses of the 1987 US stock market 
crash and the Asian meltdown of the 1990s are worth quoting at some length as they 
provide important insights: 
 
At one point the economic system appears stable, the next it behaves as though 
a dam has reached a breaking point, and water (read, confidence) evacuates its 
reservoir. The United States experienced such a sudden change with the 
decline in stock prices of more than 20 percent on October 19, 1987. There is 
no credible scenario that can readily explain so abrupt a change in the 
fundamentals of long-term valuation on that one day. Such market panic does 
not appear to reflect a simple continuum from the immediately previous 
period. The abrupt onset of such implosions suggests the possibility that there 
is a marked dividing line for confidence. When crossed, prices slip into free 
fall -- perhaps overshooting the long-term equilibrium -- before markets will 
stabilize. 
 
But why do these events seem to erupt without some readily evident 
precursors? Certainly, the more extended the risk-taking, or more generally, 
the lower the discount factors applied to future outcomes, the more vulnerable 
are markets to a shock that abruptly triggers a revision in expectations and sets 
off a vicious cycle of contraction. 
 
Episodes of vicious cycles cannot easily be forecast, as our recent experience 
with Asia has demonstrated. The causes of such episodes are complex and 
often subtle. In the case of Asia, we can now say with some confidence that the 
economies affected by this crisis faced a critical mass of vulnerabilities; ex 
ante, some were more apparent than others, but the combination was not 
generally recognized as critical.  
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This irrational exuberance and pessimism of the markets and the  structural factors 
present in most developing countries combine to make developing countries subject to 
very great downside risks of free capital movements.  
 
This does not mean that these countries do not need foreign capital. Quite the 
contrary. But what they require for their industrialization and the development of the 
real economy is “patient” long term capital.  This can only be achieved through capital 
controls. (See further Chang and Singh, 1999.) 
 
The poorest of developing countries require, on the other hand, higher levels of 
concessional finance on a sustained long term basis and a halt to large reverse 
transfers occurring through debt servicing and depressed commodity prices and poor 
terms of trade. 
 
As far as long term aid and debt relief is concerned, an important issue concerns that 
of the conditionalities imposed by international organizations and by advanced 
countries.  In view of the fact that there are many different paths to development, 
international organizations should let developing country governments determine their 
own social and economic policies and trajectories. 
 
VII.2.c Safety nets and social insurance for the long term 
 
After the 1994 Mexican crisis, the IFIs suggested that they had learned how to avoid 
similar meltdowns in the future.  However, in the light of the Asian crisis, it is now 
implicitly acknowledged that under a regime of relatively free capital flows, such 
meltdowns may recurr and cannot be predicted.  It has become commonplace, 
therefore, for IFIs to suggest that the onus is on developing countries to establish 
safety nets and social insurance systems.  Briefly three points need to be made.  First, 
as Ranis and Stewart (1999) point out, World Bank schemes of “targeting”  have been 
unsuccessful in providing safety nets for the poor, particularly for the poorest.  
Second, common sense and experience tells us that Mr. Wolfensohn is correct in his 
basic perception that the best safety net is still that provided by full employment. 
Hence the primary focus of  international institutions and governments should be on 
policies to generate full employment.    
 
The third point concerns what lessons are to be drawn from the current financial crises 
by the international organizations regarding their preferred schemes for old age 
pensions and social insurance, involving privatization,  in developing countries.  One 
of the claims of the World Bank’s proposals on this subject was that these would not 
only help provide better protection for old age, but that they would also help overall 
economic growth by promoting the growth of stock markets.  The meltdown which 
has occurred in the stock markets in many emerging economies would suggest that 
this claim needs to be reassessed and developing countries advised accordingly.  
Similarly, the ILO should have carried out a serious actuarial analysis, for which it had 
the staff and adequate resources, before proclaiming that it was a relatively simple 
matter to provide unemployment insurance for the populations of the fast growing 
Asian countries. 
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VII.3  Non-inflationary growth 
 
Most people would accept the IFI’s objective that countries and governments should 
live within their means and not have unsustainable balance of payments or budget 
deficits.  The experience, however, is that often there is disequilibria caused by 
external events over which a typical small open economy has no control.  Therefore a 
more stable international economic environment achieved through international and 
national regulation of international capital flows should help to further these national 
goals.  There is a great deal of controversy, however, over IMF adjustment 
programmes to deal with a crisis once it has occurred. Critics claim that these 
progammes are more costly than necessary, as noted above. Equally significantly, the 
IMF programmes may make countries adopt structural measures which are inimical to 
their long term economic and social, even political interests.  To restore international 
confidence in these programmes and to achieve proper international accountability, 
such IMF programmes need to be independently reviewed and assessed.  One 
important way to achieve this could be for international agencies to establish a joint 
review mechanism under the aegis of the United Nations for such purposes. 
 
VII. 4 Employment friendly growth 
 
There are two important policy issues to consider regarding employment friendly 
growth.  First, there is the question of the broad economic strategy to be adopted by a 
couuntry to promote long term growth and employment. This requires careful study of 
the historical and current specific economic and institutional circumstances of each 
country which must involve local expertise. International agencies can do no more 
than convey their own perceived wisdom of comparitive experience. 
 
The second relates to projects carried out by international institutions in developing 
countries to generate paid work, such as public works, and food for work schemes, 
labour intensive infrastructure initiatives.  Here the agencies need to co-operate with a 
view to devising best practice solutions which can be recommended to national 
governments. 
 
 
VIII. Short Term Policy Responses to Financial Crisis 
 
It will be immediately recognised that there is a potential conflict between short and 
long term measures to cope with the social consequences of financial crisis. Short 
term measures such as government transfer payments to the poor may relieve 
immediate hardship but these may be at the expense of long term investment which 
creates jobs in the future. There are clearly trade-offs here which must be explicitly 
taken into account by policy makers. It is also important to recognise that the inter-
temporal choices between current and future consumption may be rather different for 
the poor and the not-so-poor, the former giving greater weight to current consumption. 
 
There is international concensus that the immediate response in the wake of financial 
and economic crisis should include measures of social provision, such as subsidized 
food, or schemes for ensuring that the children of those seriously affected continue to 
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go to school.  There is also common agreement, the IMF included, that such measures 
require a large expansion of the role of the government and direct intervention in 
market processes.  A number of international institutions, particularly the World 
Bank, are carrying out schemes to help the poor directly. The World Bank provides 
considerable financial assistance for this purpose. The important question here is 
whether such help is going to be adequate to cope with the extent of the human 
deprivation brought about by the crisis. While welcoming such financial assistance 
and the IFI’s present willingness to accept measures such as food subsidies, it must be 
pointed out that the size of these programmes do not seem adequate to the short term 
needs.  This is evident in Indonesia, where the social fabric of the whole society seems 
to have been deeply undermined by the crisis and lack of adequate measures to deal 
with its social and economic impact on the people.  
 
The second point is that social safety net arrangements should not be regarded as just a 
momentary humanitarian gesture but are an essential part of the measures needed in 
order to build a way out of the crisis.  In view of the enormous magnitude of the crisis, 
the affected societies will only be able to overcome this episode if they can maintain a 
degree of social cohesion and political unity.  There is a huge task of restructuring and 
adjustment to be carried out in the various sectors of the economy and this requires a 
strong and bold government, backed by broad social concensus. The latter, however, 
will only materialize if the costs of adjustment are as far as possible equitably shared 
and seen to be so.   
 
It is also important for the success of the adjustment programme that it be arrived at 
and implemented in a democratic way. This is particularly so for the far-reaching 
structural adjustment programmes that the IMF has required these countries to 
implement.  For example, they are required to change labour laws, corporate 
governance and traditional relationships between government, business and finance.  
Leaving aside the question of  the morality of an international agency engaging in 
such interference in the internal affairs of a nation state, as important a question is 
whether  the programme has the willing assent not only of the Ministry of Finance but 
also of all sectors of the population. 
 
In a financial crisis the IMF’s main immediate concern is to reassure the international 
financial community rather than be too sensitive to the resulting difficulties and 
hardships of the people of the affected countries.  But for any programme to stand a 
chance of success under a non-authoritarian regime, it is essential that there be 
transparency and wide consultation and involvement through local processes and 
institutions in the formulation and implementation of these programmes. 
 
 
 
IX. Conclusion 
 
The main points made in this paper emphasize the  
 
1. Enormous economic and social progress has been made in the last half century in 
reducing poverty and raising the standard of living of people around the world and 
arguably even of women. 
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2.  However, there is still a very long way to go if minimum standards of a decent life 
are to be provided on a sustainable basis to the billion or so people who presently fall 
below that standard.  
 
3. To achieve this objective requires there to be remunerative work for all those who 
need or desire it, which in turn necessitates fast, stable and non-inflationary growth.  
The main constraint on this growth does not lie on the supply side but rather on the 
side of demand. 
 
4. The policies and institutional changes required to achieve a trend increase in the 
rate of growth of real world demand are outlined, as are those which are needed to 
ensure that the growth is stable, non-inflationary and employment friendly. 
 
5. International financial institutions and other international organizations can play a 
vital role in this process, both by positive actions and, perhaps more significantly, by 
refraining from doing what they do at present. 
 
   
 
 
 
 
